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Sender–receiver models in the style of Lewis (1969), Hurford (1989),
or Nowak and Krakauer (1999) can be used to explain meaning of signals
in situations of cooperative interaction. This paper provides a complete
characterization of neutrally stable strategies of this game purely in terms
of properties of the lexical matrices that agents use for sending and re-
ceiving messages. It is show that in a neutrally stable strategy there can
be instances of both homonymy and synonymy as long as the degree of
ambiguity is not too high. There be two (or more) events that are linked
to the same signal or two (or more) signals that are linked to the same
event, but there cannot be two (or more) signals that are linked to two (or
more) events in parallel, and there cannot be no signal that remains idle in
the presence of an event that is never possibly inferred. This has consider-
able consequences for the regularity patterns of the signaling system that
can be explained to arise from a replicator dynamics in a population of
individual agents. Building on a result by Bomze (2002) it can be shown
that such an evolutionary dynamics does not necessarily lead to an opti-
mal signaling system, but that it can be trapped in suboptimal situations,
where due to ambiguous event–signal relations some of the potential of
communication is left unexploited.
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11 Introduction
The adoption of game theoretic methods for analyzing phenomena of natural
language dates back relatively early into the history of game theory.
In his 1969 book “Convention: A philosophical study” David K. Lewis put
forward the concept of Nash equilibrium to explain the conventional character of
natural languages. By that time, the classical position that languages are social
conventions had been challenged by the critiques of W.V. Quine and others,
who argued that natural languages cannot be like the well–understood cases of
central conventions, since we could not possibly have agreed on them without
the use of any, even rudimentary, communication device. Against this, Lewis,
himself a student of Quine, who had gotten into contact with the theory of
coordination games by Thomas C. Schelling, defended the view that languages
are conventions—however not in the sense of centrally organized institutions,
but in the sense of so–called self–enforcing agreements. Provided that everybody
is doing his or her part of a convention, no individual agent has an incentive to
deviate. In the language of game theory, this is exactly what is known as Nash
equilibrium. These equilibria, Lewis argues, are supported by agents proceeding
by precedent and basing their choices on a system of mutually interacting higher
order expectations.1 Once established, therefore, such equilibria will persist
without the need of any centrally coordinating authority.
To make this point of view more precise, Lewis (1969) introduces a simple
coordination game that can be used to explain the conventional character of
simple signaling systems. In this game, there are two types of players; a player
who is informed about the state of the world, and an uninformed player who,
depending on the state of the world, is called to take an action that is payoﬀ
relevant for both players in a perfectly coinciding way, so that there is no element
of conﬂict between the two parties involved. This game is embedded in a round
of pre–play communication, where the strategy set of the informed player is a
set of mappings from states of the world to signals, and the strategy set of the
uninformed player is a set of mappings form signals to actions. It is assumed
that for each state of the world there is exactly one action that has to be
taken—taking this action, therefore, can be interpreted as “understanding” the
state of the world and actions can be identiﬁed with the states of the world by
which they are called for. Players can be referred to as senders and receivers
according to their respective roles in latent communication, leading to a pure
coordination game, where senders and receivers have to coordinate on meaning
that is attributed to signals.
Clearly, a combination of strategy choices such that the sender’s strategy is a
bijective mapping form states of the world to signals and the receiver’s strategy
the inverse of this mapping is a Nash equilibrium of this game. Not only this,
it is even a Nash equilibrium that achieves the maximal available payoﬀ. Lewis
1Interestingly, this led Lewis to one of the ﬁrst formulations of common knowledge. In their
article on incomplete information in the Handbook of Game Theory Aumann and Heifetz
(2001) write that “Lewis (1969) was the ﬁrst to deﬁne common knowledge, which of course is
a multi-person, interactive concept; though verbal, his treatment was entirely rigorous.”
2calls such equilibria conventional signaling system. Meaning in this context can
be understood as a property of these equilibria. However, without restricting
strategy sets to one–to–one mappings, this game also admits Nash equilibria that
do not attain the maximal available payoﬀ. In such situations there are two (or
more) events mapped to the same signal, or two (or more) signals mapped to
the same action.
Besides its important conceptual innovations, Lewis’ contribution therefore
still leaves us with two problems. First, the selection of what he calls conven-
tional signals systems remains conﬁned to more purely ad hoc considerations.
Second, his central argument that languages are conventions in the sense of
self–enforcing agreements does not address the corner stone of the critique of
Quine and others—it does not explain how these conventions had come into
being in the ﬁrst place. Of course, this is a reﬂection of the static nature of
Nash equilibrium itself. Explaining how conventions of language can come into
being in the ﬁrst place necessarily calls for an evolutionary approach.
1.1 Evolutionary stability
W¨ arneryd (1993) takes up Lewis’ model exactly with this perspective. He shows
that conventional signaling systems in the sense of Lewis are the only evolution-
arily stable strategies and—abstracting from the possibility of mixed strategies—
also the only neutrally stable strategies of this game. Taylor and Jonker (1978)
show that evolutionary stability implies asymptotic stability in the replicator
dynamics, whereas Thomas (1985), even more fundamentally, shows that neu-
tral stability implies Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. W¨ arneryd
suggests this as an argument for the rise of a conventional signaling system in
the sense of Lewis by a trial–and–error process.
In the presence of mixed strategies, however, it is no longer true that conven-
tional signaling systems are the only neutrally stable strategies. The problem
with this, though, is that in a dynamic, population based setting, mixed strate-
gies necessarily arise as the non–monomorphic states of this system, where the
population is composed of diﬀerent types of otherwise identical agents using
diﬀerent pure strategies. A complete treatment of the evolutionary aspects of
this model—and this is the ﬁrst motivation for the present paper—therefore,
has to be complemented by an analysis of neutral stability that also takes into
account the possibility of mixed strategies.
1.2 Origins of a proto–language
Equivalent versions of this model have been introduced independently by James
Hurford in his 1989 article “On the biological evolution of the Saussurean Sign”
as well as by Martin A. Nowak and David Krakauer in “The evolution of lan-
guage” (Hurford, 1989; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999). Both of these articles—
having originated in linguistics on the one hand and mathematical biology on
the other hand—can be said to have been seminal contributions of the then
newly emerging literature on language evolution that uses formal evolutionary
3arguments and which recently seems to evolve into a uniﬁed interdisciplinary
research program2. While Hurford (1989) wants to give an evolutionary argu-
ment for a particular design feature of concept–signal relations on which human
language essentially builds—he wants to explain the rise of the so–called Saus-
surean sign, that is, the property that these relations are symmetric—Nowak
and Krakauer (1999) are more interested in explaining how a common set of
concept–signal relations, which they interpret in the sense of a proto–language,
can emerge from a previously completely non–linguistic population by a simple
replication mechanism that gives positive feedback to successful communication.
In the Hurford–Nowak–Krakauer version of this model, every individual
agent has a so–called sender matrix and a receiver matrix, where the sender
matrix gives the probabilities with which this individual will produce the var-
ious available signals in case a particular event is observed, and the receiver
matrix gives the probabilities with which this individual will associate incoming
signals with the various events. From this, for a given distribution of event fre-
quencies, one can calculate the rate of successful communication between any
pair of a sender and receiver matrix. Payoﬀs in this framework then are directly
taken to be in terms of successful communication. However, what lurks behind
this game, clearly is a situation where an informed player can send a signal to
an uninformed player who then has to take a payoﬀ relevant action. Formally,
the game in its Hurford–Nowak set–up can be seen as a mixed strategy version
of the Lewis–W¨ arneryd model.
Both Hurford (1989) as well as Nowak and Krakauer (1999) approach their
respective questions with computer simulations. Whereas Hurford (1989) fo-
cuses on comparing the communicative performance of several behavioral rules
that diﬀer with respect to the individual’s adjustment between sender and re-
ceiver matrices, the simulation reported in Nowak and Krakauer (1999) is more
in the style of a pure replicator dynamics where individual agents are simple
automatons.
Starting from randomly drawn sender and receiver matrices, in every period,
every individual agent once communicates with every other individual agent in
each of the two roles. Payoﬀs are calculated, and in the following period every
individual strategy, that is, a pair of a sender and receiver matrix, replicates
itself according to its payoﬀ relative to the population’s average payoﬀ. They
ﬁnd that after a certain number of rounds, indeed, speciﬁc signals start to
correspond with speciﬁc events, and ﬁnally there seems to be convergence to
what can be called a common proto–language.
1.3 Can homonymy be evolutionarily stable?
Interestingly, this common proto–language has the property that some signals
remain idle while there are events that share the use of one and the same signal.
In linguistics the phenomenon that one signal is used for more then one referent
is known as homonymy, whereas synonymy refers to a situation where one event
2See Christiansen and Kirby (2003)
4is linked to more than one signal. As a consequence, in such a situation, some of
the potential of communication that is in principle available is left unexploited.
From this Nowak and Krakauer (1999) conjecture that
“evolution does not always lead to the optimum solution, but certain
suboptimum solutions, in which the same signal is used for two (or
more) objects, can be evolutionarily stable.”
This, however, needs explanation in view of the formal result shown in
W¨ arneryd (1993) that only those sender–receiver structures that induce a bi-
jective mapping from events to signals can be evolutionarily stable, and which
later on independently has been shown by Trapa and Nowak (2000) for the
slightly diﬀerent framework with sender and receiver matrices, in which it reads
that only those sender–receiver pairs where the sender matrix is a permutation
matrix and the receiver matrix is the transpose of the sender matrix (and, of
course, vice versa) can be evolutionarily stable. As a consequence of this result,
of course, a proto–language where two (or more) events are linked to the same
signal or where two (or more) signals are linked to the same event, cannot be
evolutionarily stable—at least not in its strict sense.
The interesting question arising from this—and this is the second motivation
for the present paper—is whether we can account for the results of simulation
reported in Nowak and Krakauer (1999) from an analytical point of view. That
is, I want to ask whether there are, and, if so, what are the properties of Nash
strategies that cannot be evolutionary stable (not in the strict sense), but that
still can protect themselves from being driven out by the replicator dynamics
of this model. As it turns out, neutral stability and its dynamic consequences
provide the key to explaining this.
1.4 The plan of the work
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model in the
conceptual framework of Hurford (1989) and Nowak and Krakauer (1999) and
shows how to derive it in this form as the symmetrized, mixed–strategies version
of the game in the Lewis–W¨ arneryd framework. Section 3 elaborates on Nash
strategies and the best–response properties in terms of sender and receiver ma-
trices. Section 4 introduces evolutionary stability and neutral stability formally.
Section 5 uses the best response properties of sender and receiver matrices to de-
rive a complete characterization of neutrally stable strategies that encompasses
the possibility of mixed strategies. Section 6 reformulates the model under study
as a population game, where the population is composed of diﬀerent types of
otherwise identical players, each of which links every event to exactly one signal
with probability 1, and associates every received signal with exactly one event
with probability 1. In this framework, the population’s average strategy is a
pair of two stochastic matrices, as in the Hurford–Nowak–Krakauer version of
this model. In particular, this section discusses the properties of Nash strate-
gies and evolutionarily stable strategies with respect to the cognitive abilities
of individual agents in the context of population games. Section 7 is concerned
5with the qualitative analysis of the replicator dynamics of this model. This
essentially makes use of a result by Bomze (2002), who establishes equivalence
of neutral stability and Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics for dou-
bly symmetric games with pairwise interaction. Section 8, ﬁnally, discusses the
results and sheds some light on extensions of the model and future work.
2 The model
In the basic framework as introduced by Hurford (1989) and Nowak and Krakauer
(1999) there is a large number of individual agents among whom communication
potentially takes place. There are n events that possibly become the object of
communication, and there are m signals that can be used to communicate these





























denotes an individual’s sender matrix, where pij indicates the probability with
which signal j will be transmitted if event i is to be communicated, so that
P ∈ P∆











































denotes an individual’s receiver matrix, where qji gives the probability with
which event i will be inferred if signal j is received.
If an individual with receiver matrix P wants to communicate event i to
an individual with receiver matrix Q, then the probability that he or she is




6Assuming that all events that possibly become the object of communication
occur with the same probability and are equally important, as well as that all






pijqji = tr(PQ), (1)
can be taken as a measure for the communicative potential between an individual
with sender matrix P and an individual with receiver matrix Q.
2.1 The asymmetric game
This set–up can be rephrased as an asymmetric game with two types of players,
senders and receivers, where senders choose a strategy P ∈ P∆
n×m and receivers
choose a strategy Q ∈ Q∆
m×n. Assuming that communication is mutually bene-
ﬁcial, the communicative potential tr(PQ) can be taken as the payoﬀ that both
parties get out of their interaction, such that FP(P,Q), the payoﬀ function for
senders, as well as FQ(P,Q), the payoﬀ function for receivers, is given by
FP(P,Q) = tr(PQ) = FQ(P,Q). (2)
This form of this payoﬀ function can be interpreted in the sense that the
very act of communication is beneﬁcial in itself, for example, as a means to
establish kin relations that transcend the limits of physical grooming, or it can
be interpreted as the reﬂection of some richer structure, where a player who
is informed about the state of the world can send a signal to an uninformed
player, who then has to take some payoﬀ relevant action, the gains of which
are shared between the two players. As an example of this we can think of two
agents coordinating their actions in some common undertaking like the hunting
of game or the ﬁshing of ﬁsh. Alternatively, if we are willing to interpret the
sharing of the payoﬀ in the sense of some element of direct or reciprocal altruism,
we can think of one agent informing the other of some event of nature in the
face of which the previously uninformed agent has to take a particular action in
order to protect his well being or that of fellow members of the same group.
2.2 A symmetrized, doubly symmetric, game
Nowak and Krakauer (1999), which later on has been analyzed in more detail in
Trapa and Nowak (2000), consider a symmetrized version of this game3, where












3a game is symmetric if all player have the same strategy sets and payoﬀ functions
7The choice of the weights in this payoﬀ function can be interpreted in the sense
that there is a homogenous group of individual agents all of whom ﬁnd them-
selves in the roles of sender and receiver with equal probabilities.








giving rise to a so-called doubly symmetric game, that is, a symmetric game
with a symmetric payoﬀ function 4.






n×m,FP(P,Q) = tr(PQ),FQ(P,Q) = tr(PQ)
	
(5)















to refer to the symmetrized, doubly symmetric, version of this game.
2.3 Pure strategies
Formally, if we restrict the strategy sets of senders and receivers to the set of
all n×m and respectively m×n matrices that have exactly one 1 in every row
and zero otherwise, that is, if




n×m : pij = 1 for some j0(i) and
pij = 0 ∀ j 6= j0(i), ∀ i}, (7)
and




m×n : qji = 1 for some i0(j) and
qji = 0 ∀ i 6= i0(j), ∀ j}, (8)
we get the set of all sender and receiver matrices that link every event determin-
istically to exactly one signal and every signal to exactly one event. Note that
this does not rule out there to be two or more events that are linked to the same
signal, or two or more signals that are associated with the same event. There
are mn such deterministic sender matrices in Pn×m and nm such deterministic
receiver matrices in Qm×n.
If we can identify a state of the world with the action that it calls for, these
deterministic sender and receiver matrices give us equivalent expressions for the
strategy sets of informed and respectively uninformed players that Lewis (1969)
and W¨ arneryd (1993) use for their model of a signaling system.
4In the literature symmetric games with a symmetric payoﬀ function are sometimes also
referred to as partnership games.
8Due to the linear structure of the payoﬀ function, we can “decompose” the
sender–receiver games G∆
m,n and respectively Γ∆
m,n into their equivalents in pure
strategies, the asymmetric sender–receiver game
Gm,n = {Pn×m,Qn×m,FP(P,Q) = tr(PQ),FQ(P,Q) = tr(PQ)}, (9)













The game in its Hurford–Nowak–Krakauer form, therefore, can be seen as the
symmetrized, mixed–strategy version of the Lewis–W¨ arneryd sender–receiver
model.
Example 1. Let m = 2 = n. In this case the set of all sender and receiver


















































respectively. By an appropriate choice of weights, possibly not unique, we can
decompose every element P in P∆
2×2 into a convex combination of the 4 pure










































, for any p ∈ [0,1].
93 Nash strategies
Trapa and Nowak (2000) analyze Nash strategies, strict Nash strategies and
evolutionarily stable strategies of the game Γ∆
m,n, the sender–receiver game in
its symmetrized, mixed–strategies form.
In the tradition of evolutionary game theory, a strategy played in a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium—that is, a strategy that is a best reply to itself—is called
a Nash strategy.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m is called
(a) a Nash strategy if
F[(P∗,Q∗),(P∗,Q∗)] ≥ F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)] ∀ (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m;
(b) it is called a strict Nash strategy if





B(P) = {Q ∈ Q∆
m×n : tr(PQ) ≥ tr(PQ0) ∀ Q0 ∈ Q∆
m×n} and
B(Q) = {P ∈ P∆
n×m : tr(PQ) ≥ tr(P0Q) ∀ P0 ∈ P∆
n×m}
be the set of best responses to P and respectively Q in the asymmetric game.
Of course, since for ﬁxed ¯ P the continuous function tr( ¯ PQ) attains a maximum
on Q∆
n×m, and since for ﬁxed ¯ Q, tr(P ¯ Q) attains a maximum on P∆
m×n, both
B( ¯ P) as well as B( ¯ Q) are always non–empty .
Following Selten (1980), as a general property of symmetrized games, for a
Nash strategy, the strategy choices in the two roles have to be best responses to
each other, and they have to be unique best responses in a strict Nash strategy.
That is, (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m is
(a) a Nash strategy of the game Γ∆
m,n if and only if P∗ ∈ B(Q∗) and Q∗ ∈
B(P∗); and
(b) it is a strict Nash strategy of Γ∆
m,n if and only if P∗ is the unique element
in B(Q∗) and Q∗ is the unique element in B(P∗).
If we can complement this with a characterization of best–responses in terms
of the P and Q matrices we will be enabled to characterize the Nash strategies
of the game Γ∆
m,n.
3.1 Best–responses in terms of P and Q matrices
Some extra notation helps exposition. Let
A(p·j∗) = argmaxi(pij∗) (11)
10be the set of all row indices i in the j∗–the column of P such that pij∗ is a
maximal element of that column, and analogously let
A(q·i∗) = argmaxj(qji∗), (12)
be the set of all row indices j in the i∗–th column of Q such that qji∗ is a
maximal element of that column.
Suppose now we are given some ﬁxed ¯ P and we want to ﬁnd all receiver ma-
trices Q that maximize tr( ¯ PQ). Since the elements in Q are row–wise bounded
to add up to 1, for ﬁxed ¯ P, it is convenient to understand the operator tr( ¯ PQ)
as multiplying the j-th column in ¯ P with the j-th row of Q, and then summing
over all j,











= ¯ p11q11 + ¯ p21q12 ··· + ¯ pn1q1n
+ ¯ p12q21 + ¯ p22q22 ··· + ¯ pn2q2n
. . . (13)
+ ¯ p1mqm1 + ¯ p2mqm2 ··· + ¯ pnmqmn. (14)
Finding a Q that maximizes tr( ¯ PQ) then amounts to choosing optimal “weights”
qji to their corresponding elements ¯ pij such that
P
i ¯ pijqji is maximal for every
j.5
Fix, for example, the j?–th column of ¯ P and suppose that it contains a
unique maximal element, say ¯ pi?j?. Then in order to maximize
P
i ¯ pij?qj?i it
is clearly the optimal choice to put “full weight” to ¯ pi?j?—that is, to set qj?i?
equal to 1, and all the other elements in the j?-th row of Q equal to zero. If,
on the other hand, the j?-th column of ¯ P contains more than one maximal
element, then there is more than one optimal appointment of the elements in
the j?-th row of Q. All the corner solutions, where full weight is put to any of
the maximal elements in the j?-th column of ¯ P, as well as any of their convex
combinations fulﬁll the task of maximizing
P
i ¯ pij?qj?i. But no matter how the
total mass of 1 is attached to the elements in the j?-th column of ¯ P, there is no
way of doing better than to “extract” from the j?-th column of ¯ P the value of
its maximum.
If Q is ﬁxed and the entries in P are to be chosen optimally so that tr(PQ)
is maximized, exactly the same logic applies —only with the roles of P and Q
reversed. Note that, in this case, one proceeds by columns in Q and rows in P.
The following lemma summarizes these observations.
Lemma 1 (Best response properties). Let ¯ P ∈ P∆
n×m and ¯ Q ∈ Q∆
n×m.
5Whenever in the sequel I talk about the “corresponding” element (in Q) to some element
pij, I mean it to be the element qji; analogously I refer to pij as the “corresponding element”
of qji.
11(a) For any Q ∈ B( ¯ P)
X
i∈A(p·j?)
qj?i = 1 and qj?i = 0 ∀ i / ∈ A(p·j?);
for any P ∈ B( ¯ Q)
X
j∈A(q·i?)
pi?j = 1 and pi?j = 0 ∀ j / ∈ A(q·i?).












































If in point (a) ¯ pi∗j∗ is the unique maximal element in the j∗–th column of ¯ P,
then of course for any Q that is a best response to ¯ P, qj?i? = 1. The proposition
in (b) directly follows from (a); any Q that is optimal to some ﬁxed ¯ P never
can “extract” from ¯ P more than the sum of its column maxima. Analogous
reasoning applies for the roles of P and Q reversed.








 with x ∈ (0,1).
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where y equals 0 and 1 respectively. It is easily checked that





pij = x + (1 − x) + 1
12for all Q ∈ B(P1).
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 with y ∈ (0,1),
















With Lemma 1 now it is fairly easy to identify the Nash strategies of this
game. All we have to do is to look at each column in P and Q and to check
whether the corresponding rows in Q and P, respectively, fulﬁll the best–
response criteria. For example, the pair (P1,Q1) from above clearly is a Nash
strategy—P1 is a best response to Q1, and Q1 is a best response to P1.
3.2 Minimal consistency
Lemma 1 together with the condition that in a Nash strategy the sender and
the receiver matrices have to be best responses to each other can be interpreted
in the sense of some minimal consistency criteria between the entries that are
used for sending and receiving messages.
Lemma 2. The pair (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m is a Nash strategy if and only if
the following conditions hold true:
(a) whenever , qj?i? 6= 0, then pi?j? 6= 0 or pij∗ = 0 ∀i and
(b) whenever pi?j? 6= 0, then qj?i? 6= 0 or qji∗ = 0 ∀j.
Proof. The proof is just by the contrapositive of Lemma 1. If for some Q ∈
B(P), qj?i? 6= 0, then from Lemma 1 we know that, pi?j? ∈ A(p·j?). That
is, whenever qj?i? is positive, then the corresponding element pi?j? in any P
to which Q is a best–response only can be a maximal element of that column.
This maximum can be everything between zero and one, including zero and one.
However, whenever it is zero, then there are indeed no non–zero elements in this
column. Analogous implications hold true for the roles of P and Q reversed.
A zero column in P means that there is a signal that is never used by an
individual endowed with this sender matrix. A zero column in Q, on the other
hand, means that there is an event that is never possibly inferred, which we
can interpret in the sense that an individual with such a receiver matrix has no
concept of the respective event. With this in mind the above lemma reads as
follows: Whenever in the position of the sender an event i? is linked to signal j?
with some probability, then in the position of the receiver, event i? is either also
associated with signal j? with at least some probability, or, if this is not the case,
13then the individual under study has indeed no concept of event i?. Analogously,
whenever in the position of the receiver, event i? is associated with signal j?
with some probability, then in the position of the sender, event i? is either also
linked to signal j? with some probability, or, if this is not the case, then signal
j? remains idle.
3.3 Features of Nash strategies
There are two features of Nash strategies that are particularly interesting:
(1) There can be two (or more) events that are linked to the same signal, or
two (or more) signals that are associated with the same event; and
(2) there can be zero columns in P or Q, or in both, the P and the Q matrix.
In linguistics the phenomenon that two or more objects of communication
are linked to the same signal is called homonymy, whereas synonymy refers to
a situation where the same object is linked to more than one signal.
In fact, we have already encountered instantiations of these phenomena in
Example 2 above. Sender matrix P1 links both event 2 as well as event 3 to
signal 3—homonymy, whereas receiver matrix Q1 associates both signal 1 as
well as signal 2 with event 1—synonymy.
If we vary Example 2 slightly, we can get examples of Nash strategies that
have zero columns in the sender or the receiver matrix or also in both, the sender





















The problem with zero columns is that they destroy the otherwise fairly
uniform patterns of Nash strategies. Suppose we start out with some Nash
strategy, (P∗,Q∗). Whenever there is a zero column in one of the two matrices,
say in Q∗, then in order to preserve the Nash property it is irrelevant how we
assign the entries in the corresponding row of P∗—as long as we do not change







1 − x x 0













Note that the Q matrix is the same as in the previous example. Since the second
column in Q consists entirely of zeros, in order for P to be a best response to
Q it is irrelevant how we assign the full mass of 1 to the various elements in the
second row of P, but we have to make sure that Q still is a best response to P,
which, for the present case, is indeed guaranteed as long as p21 stays  below
p11 and p22 stays  below p12.
14Trapa and Nowak (2000) characterize the class of Nash strategies that is
deﬁned by the condition that neither P nor Q contains a zero columns.
Lemma 3 (Trapa and Nowak, 2000). Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n and
assume that neither P nor Q contains any column that consists entirely of zeros.
Then (P,Q) is a Nash strategy if and only if there exist real numbers p1,...,pn
and q1,...,qm such that
(i) for each j, the j-th column of P has its entries drawn from {0,pj}, and
pij = pj if and only if qji = qi; and
(ii) for each i, the i-th column of Q has its entries drawn from {0,qi}, and—as
a matter of consistency—qji = qi if and only if pij = pj.
The multiplicity of event–signal relations that might occur in a Nash strategy
is not bound to occur in only one dimension. In addition to isolated cases of
homonymy or synonymy—as we have seen them in Example 2—there also can
be combinations of these phenomena, where two (or more) events that are linked
to the same signal with some positive probability are also linked to some other









































From Lemma 1 it is easily seen that in order to have a strict Nash strategy—
that is, a pair (P∗,Q∗) such that P∗ is a unique best–response to Q? and vice
versa—there has to be exactly one 1 in each column of P∗ and respectively Q∗,
such that q∗
ji = 1 whenever p∗
ij = 1. That is, in case n = m, a pair (P∗,Q∗) is
a strict Nash strategy, if and only if P∗ is a permutation matrix6 and Q∗ the
transpose of P∗, which ﬁrst has been shown by Trapa and Nowak (2000).
4 Evolutionary stability criteria
The most important stability concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an
evolutionarily stable strategy.
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m ×Q∆
n×m is called an evolutionarily
stable strategy if
6An n × n matrix A is called a permutation matrix if every row and every column of A
contains exactly one 1 and all the other elements are zero.
15(i) it is a Nash strategy, and if
(ii) F[(P∗,Q∗),(P∗,Q∗)] = F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)] implies that




In words, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if it is a Nash strategy, and
if, in addition to that, whenever there is an alternative best reply, then the
original Nash strategy is a better reply to this alternative best reply than this
alternative best reply is to itself. A weaker version of this concept, where the
strict inequality in (ii) in the deﬁnition above is replaced by a weak inequality
sign is known as neutral stability.
Deﬁnition 3. A strategy (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m is called a neutraly stable
strategy if
(i) it is a Nash strategy, and if
(ii) F[(P∗,Q∗),(P∗,Q∗)] = F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)] implies that
F[(P∗,Q∗),(P,Q)] ≥ F[(P,Q),(P,Q)] ∀ (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
n×m.
Though, formally a static concept, evolutionary stability has been conceived
to capture the idea that a strategy can protect itself against the invasion of
mutant strategies, or put diﬀerently, that it can drive out mutant strategies.
Neutral stability, instead, expresses the idea that a strategy cannot be driven
out by other possibly invading strategies, at least not in the absence of neutral
drift. On the other hand, this means that neutral stability describes a situation
where there is room for neutral drift.
From the deﬁnitions above we directly see that the following chain of impli-
cations holds true:
strict Nash ⇒ evolutionarily stable ⇒ neutrally stable ⇒ Nash.
Selten (1980) shows that for the class of symmetrized games evolutionary
stability implies strict Nash, so that for symmetrized games a strategy is evolu-
tionarily stable, if and only if it is a strict Nash strategy. For the symmetrized
sender–receiver game Γm,n this means that a pair (P∗,Q∗) is an evolutionarily
stable strategy if and only if P∗ is a permutation matrix and Q∗ is the transpose
of P, which ﬁrst also has been shown by Trapa and Nowak (2000).
In fact, this reﬂects an earlier result by W¨ arneryd (1993), who shows that for
the sender–receiver game in pure strategies, that is, where a sender’s strategy
links every event to exactly one signal and receiver’s strategy links every signal
to exactly one action, an equilibrium is evolutionarily stable if and only if the
sender uses a bijective mapping from events to signals and the receiver uses the
inverse of this mapping to link signals to actions, where every action can be
identiﬁed with the event of nature in the light of which it is being called for,
such that agents coordinate on a perfectly informative signaling system.
As also has been shown by W¨ arneryd (1993), for the sender–receiver game in
pure strategies, evolutionarily stable strategies are also the only neutrally stable
16strategies, or weakly evolutionarily stable strategies in the terminology that he
uses. Evolutionary stability, as it has been shown by Taylor and Jonker (1978),
and Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund (1979), implies asymptotic stability in the
replicator dynamics, whereas weak evolutionary stability, as it has been shown
by Thomas (1985), implies Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. Based
on these results, W¨ arneryd (1993) argues that a perfectly informative signaling
system will arise from a trial–and–error process in the long run.
However, if we want to think of a trial–and–error process that operates in a
population of individual agents, we are unavoidably faced with mixed strategies
as the polymorphic states of this system, where not every individual uses the
same (pure) strategy. So if we want to make this model fruitful for evolutionary
linguistics we do have to enrich its analysis by a characterization of neutrally
stable strategies that encompasses mixed strategies as well.
4.1 Evolutionary stability and neutral stability for doubly
symmetric games
Before we move on to characterize neutrally stable strategies, it is helpful to
elaborate a little bit on deﬁnitions.
Remark 1. Let (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a Nash strategy. Then for any
Q0 ∈ B(P?) and for any P0 ∈ B(Q?),
tr(P∗Q0) = tr(P∗Q∗) = tr(P0Q∗). (15)
Proof. Of course, if (P∗,Q∗) is a Nash strategy, then Q? ∈ B(P?) and P? ∈
B(Q?). Since Q0 ∈ B(P∗), tr(P∗Q0) = tr(P∗Q∗), and since P0 ∈ B(Q?),
tr(P0Q∗) = tr(P∗Q∗).
Remark 2. A strategy (P∗,Q∗) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n
(a) is an evolutionarily stable strategy if and only if
(i) P∗ ∈ B(Q∗) and Q∗ ∈ B(P∗), and in addition to that
(ii) P ∈ B(Q∗) for some P ∈ P∆
n×m and Q ∈ B(P∗) for some Q in
Q∆
m×n with P 6= P? or Q 6= Q? implies that
tr(PQ) < tr(P∗Q∗).
(b) (P∗,Q∗) is a neutrally stable strategy if and only if
(i) P∗ ∈ B(Q∗) and Q∗ ∈ B(P∗), and in addition to that
(ii) P ∈ B(Q∗) for some P ∈ P∆




17Proof. The proof is given for point (a); for (b) it is essentially the same only
with the strict inequality replaced by a weak inequality sign. Point (i) is just
the condition that the pair (P∗,Q∗) be a Nash strategy. Point (ii) replaces the
condition that whenever there is an alternative best reply, that is, a pair (P,Q)
with P 6= P? or Q 6= Q? such that
F[(P∗,Q∗),(P∗,Q∗)] = F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)], (16)
then it should be the case that
F[(P∗,Q∗),(P,Q)] > F[(P,Q),(P,Q)]. (17)
By the symmetry of the payoﬀ function, F[(P∗,Q∗),(P,Q)] = F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)].
The inequality in (17) therefore is equivalent to
F[(P,Q),(P∗,Q∗)] > F[(P,Q),(P,Q)],
which by the supposition of the condition (16) implies that
F[(P∗,Q∗),(P∗,Q∗)] > F[(P,Q),(P,Q)],
which, of course, only can be true if
tr(P∗Q∗) > tr(PQ).
Remark 2 says that if we want to check for evolutionary, or respectively
neutral stability, of a particular Nash strategy (P∗,Q∗), all we have to do is to
compare its communicative potential with itself tr(P∗Q∗), which we sometimes
also shall refer to as the eigen communicative potential of a strategy, to the
eigen communicative potential of any alternative best reply, that is, tr(PQ) for
which P ∈ B(Q∗) and Q ∈ B(P∗).
5 Neutrally stable strategies
Let us ﬁrst try to ﬁnd out what we can learn about neutral stability from the
examples of the previous section.
Example 1 (continued)
We have seen before that the pair (P1,Q1) of Example 2 with x,y ∈ (0,1) is a
Nash strategy of the game G∆
3×3. Clearly, (P1,Q1) cannot be an evolutionarily
stable strategy since the two matrices are neither permutation matrices nor is
one the transpose of the other. Here we want to see whether despite its failure
to satisfy evolutionary stability it still can be a neutrally stable strategy. What
we have to do in order to check for neutral stability, by Remark 2, is to see
18whether in case there are alternative best replies Q0
1 ∈ B(P1) and P0
1 ∈ B(Q1),
it is guaranteed that tr(Q0
1P0
1) ≥ tr(Q1P1).
The communicative potential of (P1,Q1) with respect to itself, that is,
tr(P1,Q1), equals 2. In Example 2 we have already determined the set of best re-
sponses B(P1) and B(Q1). From this we see that for every element Q0
1 ∈ B(P1)
the sum of its column maxima is 2. So with whatever sender matrix P0
1 we multi-
ply Q0
1, the resulting communicative potential tr(P0
1Q0
1) can never exceed 2. The
same is true if we ﬁx any of the sender matrices that are in B(Q1); the sum of its
column maxima is 2 and therefore with whatever receiver matrix we multiply it,
the communicative potential we can extract from it is bounded from above by 2.
So there can be no alternative best reply (P0
1,Q0
1) whose eigen communicative
potential tr(P0
1,Q0
1) is strictly greater than that of (P1,Q1). However, there are
alternative best replies that have the same eigen communicative potential as the
original (P1,Q1). As an example for such alternative best replies take a P0
1 that
is of the same structure as P1 just with a diﬀerent x ∈ (0,1), and an alternative
Q0
1 that is of the same structure as Q only with a diﬀerent y ∈ (0,1). Despite
the fact that (P1,Q1) is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, it therefore still
is a neutrally stable strategy.
Example 2 (continued)
Consider instead the Nash strategy (P2,Q2) from Example 3 and take as an


























2) = 3 > 2 = tr(P2Q2),
that is, (P0
2,Q0
2) attains a strictly higher eigen communicative potential than
(P2,Q2), and so (P2,Q2) cannot be a neutrally stable strategy.
An obvious characteristic of (P2,Q2) as opposed to (P1,Q1) is that each of
its two matrices, P2 as well as Q2, contains a column that consists entirely of
zero entries. As we have seen before, a zero column in P means that there is
a signal that is never used, whereas a zero column in Q means that there is
an event that is never possibly understood. In going from (P2,Q2) to (P0
2,Q0
2)
nothing has changed but to link the previously idle signal to the event that
before has been never understood.
It can be shown that a zero column in both the sender and the receiver
matrix is in general suﬃcient to destroy neutral stability. The idea behind this
is exactly the same as in the example above: An invading proto–language that
changes nothing about the existing linkages between events and signals, but that
in addition to that links the idle signal to the event that is never understood,
clearly is not doing worse against the resident language but can do better against
itself.
19Lemma 4. Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a Nash strategy. If each of the two
matrices, P and Q, contains at least one column that consists entirely of zeros,
then (P,Q) cannot be a neutrally stable strategy.
A formal proof of this is given in the Appendix.
However, zero columns in both P and Q is neither the only thing that can
happen to prevent a strategy form being neutrally stable, nor is it the case that
no zero column in neither P nor Q is suﬃcient to guarantee neutral stability.
Examples 4 and 5 (continued)
We have seen above that (P4,Q4) is a Nash strategy. However, it also fails to
satisfy neutral stability, which also can be seen from talking the pair (P0
2,Q0
2)
as an alternative best reply. As before, Q0
2 ∈ B(P4) and P0
2 ∈ B(Q4), but the
eigen communicative potential of (P0
2,Q0




2) = 3 > 2 = tr(P4Q4),
and so (P4,Q4) cannot be a neutrally stable strategy. Note that this is true
even though neither P4 nor Q4 contains a column that consists entirely of zeros.
What destroys neutral stability in this case is the fact that in both matrices,
P4 and Q4, there are columns with multiple maximal elements that are positive
but not equal to 1. For exactly the same reason strategy (P5,Q5), which we
considered in Example 6, also cannot be a neutrally stable strategy—which
again can be checked by considering (P0
2,Q0
2) as an alternative best reply.
Another instantiations of Nash strategies that are not neutrally stable are
cases where one of the two matrices, P or Q, contains a column with multiple














0 1 − β β
0 1 − β β

, β ∈ (0,1).
Again by (P0
2,Q0
2) it can be checked that (P6,Q6) also fails to be a neutrally
stable strategy.
The crucial thing in the case where one of the two matrices contains a column
with multiple maximal elements that are strictly between 0 and 1, is that the
Nash property already implies that the other matrix is bound to contain a zero
column or a column with multiple maximal elements that are strictly between
0 and 1.
Lemma 5. Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a Nash strategy. If P [Q] contains
at least one column that has non-zero multiple maximal elements that are not
equal to 1, then Q [P] contains
20(i) at least two columns that have non-zero multiple maximal elements that
are not equal to 1, or
(ii) a zero column,
and (P,Q) cannot be a neutrally stable strategy.
A formal proof of this is given in the Appendix.
What lies behind this result is that if the ambiguity created by instances
of homonymy or synonymy works into both directions, then this leaves enough
room for rearranging the existing linkages between events and signals such that
a single mutation can raise its eigen communicative potential over the eigen
communicative potential of the original Nash strategy without reducing its com-
municative potential with the original Nash strategy.
5.1 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for neutral stabil-
ity
Lemmas 4 and 5 together constitute a necessary condition for neutral stability.
Lemma 6. Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a neutrally stable strategy, then
(i) at least one of the two matrices P or Q has no zero column; and
(ii) neither P nor Q contains a column with multiple maximal elements that
are strictly between 0 and 1.
Proof. Combining Lemmas 4 and 5 we have that a Nash strategy cannot be a
neutrally stable strategy if
(i) P and Q contain a zero column, or if
(ii) P or Q contains a column with multiple maximal elements that are strictly
between 0 and 1.
The contrapositive of this statement yields the claim of the proposition.
Since by deﬁnition an evolutionarily stable strategy is necessarily a neutrally
stable strategy, these conditions, of course, also have to be met by evolutionarily
stable strategies. For neutral stability, however, they also can be shown to be
suﬃcient.
Lemma 7. Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a Nash strategy. If P [Q] has no
column with multiple maximal elements that are not equal to 1,
(i) then Q [P] has no column with non–zero multiple maximal elements that
are not equal to 1; and
(ii) (P,Q) is a neutrally stable strategy.
21The proof of this, which essentially relies on exploiting the best–response
properties that must hold true between P and Q0 as well as Q and P0 of any
invading language, again is given in the Appendix.
Combining Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 we ﬁnally have a complete characteriza-
tion of neutrally stable strategies.
Proposition 1. Let (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a Nash strategy. (P,Q) is a
neutrally stable strategy if and only if
(i) at least one of the two matrices, P or Q, has no zero column, and
(ii) neither P nor Q has a column with multiple maximal elements that are
strictly between zero and 1.
This means that in a neutrally stable strategy there can be some but not too
much ambiguity. One signal can be linked to two or more events—homonymy;
but if this is the case, then these events cannot make use of any other signal to
get communicated. One event can be linked to two or more signals— synonymy;
but if this is the case, then these signals cannot be used to communicate any
other event. In addition to that, in a neutrally stable strategy, there cannot be
any idle signal as long as there are events that are never possibly understood
and vice versa. The reason behind this is that both of these situations leave
too much room for shifting around the entries in P and Q, such that there
are mutant strategies that hold equal against the original Nash strategy, but
that can raise its eigen communicative potential over the eigen communicative
potential of the original Nash strategy.
Next we want to consider what are the evolutionary consequences of this for
a particular evolutionary dynamics that formalizes the idea of a trial and error
process in a population of individual agents—the so–called replicator dynamics.
Before we do that, we have to ﬁnd a way of specifying the state space on which
this dynamics should operate so that we keep the analysis tractable. A possible
way of doing so is provided by the theory of population games.
6 Population games
Up until now—somewhat silently—we have considered a pair (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m ×
Q∆
m×n as representing the probabilities with which an individual agent will link
events to signals and signals to events. Now we want to look at it as representing
the distribution of actions in a population of individual agents.
As we have seen above, the symmetrized sender–receiver game Γ∆
m,n can be
understood as the mixed–strategies version of a game with ﬁnitely many pure
strategies, where a pure strategy is a pair of a sender and a receiver matrix
(P,Q) ∈ Pn×m × Qn×m, (18)
such that for general n and m there are L = mn×nm pure strategies. Assigning
diﬀerent weights,
x = (x1,x2,...,xL) ∈ SL,








In the framework of population games, mixed strategies can be interpreted
as the population’s average strategy resulting from the frequency distribution of
diﬀerent types of otherwise identical players each of which uses a particular pure
strategy whenever he or she is called for playing the game. In this case, xl is
the fraction of individual agents using pure strategy l, and x = (x1,x2,...,xL)
is a vector of L type frequencies.
6.1 The average population proﬁle and the ﬁtness in the
population
Suppose we are given a vector of type frequencies xl = (x1,x2,...,xL) ∈ SL,
then the average strategy proﬁle is




which also can be written as













¯ p11 ... ¯ p1j ... ¯ p1m
. . .
. . .
¯ pi1 ... ¯ pij ... ¯ pim
. . .
. . .














¯ q11 ... ¯ q1i ... ¯ q1n
. . .
. . .
¯ qj1 ... ¯ qji ... ¯ qjn
. . .
. . .














where ¯ pij is the sum of all type frequencies whose i,j–th entry in P is equal to











where superscript l indicates the type.
Assuming that agents are matched randomly according to their type fre-
quencies, the average performance of type l for a given distribution of type
7Of course, if we wish to, from the payoﬀ function (4) we can compute the payoﬀ matrix
AL×L for the symmetrized game in pure strategies simply by letting each pure strategy
(P,Q) ∈ Pn×m × Qn×m play against every other pure strategy that is contained in this set.











In an evolutionary context fl(x) can be interpreted as the ﬁtness of type l, and
¯ f(x) as the average ﬁtness in the population8.
For the sender–receiver model discussed here, the ﬁtness of type l can be




















and the average ﬁtness in the population can be written as the payoﬀ of the
population’s average from play against itself
¯ f(x) = F
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

,
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

= tr
  ¯ P(x) ¯ Q(x)

. (23)
6.2 Nash strategies in population games
With the interpretation of an element (P,Q) ∈ ∆n
m × ∆n
n as the population’s
average strategy resulting from a speciﬁc distribution of types frequencies, we
also have to reconsider the interpretations that pertain to the properties of Nash
strategies and its reﬁnements in terms of evolutionarily and neutral stability.
As it is generally true for populations games, if the average strategy proﬁle
is a Nash strategy, this implies that given the composition of the population,
x = (x1,...,xl,...,xL), every type l that is present in this population reaches
the same ﬁtness, that is,
fl(x) = ¯ f(x), ∀ l whenever xl 6= 0.
For the sender–receiver game discussed here this means that every type l that
is present in this population with some non–negligible fraction xl > 0 gets the




  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

= F
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

,
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

,
for all l for which xl 6= 0.
8In a more standard notation, given the payoﬀ matrix of the underlying stage game, the
ﬁtness function of type l can be written as fl(x) = (Ax)l, indicating the l–th entry of the
product of the payoﬀ matrix A times the vector of type frequencies; and the average ﬁtness
in the population can be written as ¯ f(x) = xAx.
24If in addition to that there is no type that yields the same payoﬀ from
communicating with the current population’s average, but that yields a strictly
higher eigen communicative potential as compared to the eigen communicative
potential of the population’s average, then this population state is neutrally
stable; and it is evolutionarily stable if upon that there is also no type that yields
the same payoﬀ from communicating with the current population’s average, but
that holds equal in terms of its eigen communicative potential as compared to
the eigen communicative potential of the population’s average.
In the framework of Example 1, where there are 2 events and 2 signals,
























In this case, the average population proﬁle is given by











Since ¯ P(x) is a best response to ¯ Q(x), and ¯ Q(x) is a best response to ¯ P(x),
the pair ( ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)) deﬁnitely is a Nash strategy. The average performance,
or ﬁtness, of the type that uses (P3,Q3) is























and the average performance of the type using (P3,Q4) is























which, as it should be if the population’s average strategy corresponds to a Nash
strategy, are both equal to the average performance in the population,
F[( ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)),( ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x))] = tr




















enters this population, it will get the same payoﬀ from communicating with the
population’s average as the population’s average gets from communicating with
itself,
F[(P1,Q1),( ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x))] = 1 = F
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

,
  ¯ P(x), ¯ Q(x)

,










= 2 > 1 = tr
  ¯ P(x) ¯ Q(x)

,
and so the original composition of the population cannot be neutrally stable.
Of course, it then also cannot be evolutionarily stable.
6.3 Individuals’ consistency?
We have seen above that the properties of Nash strategies can be interpreted
in the sense of some minimal consistency criteria that must be true between
the lexical entries that are used for sending and receiving messages (Lemma
2). Here I want to ask what we can learn about individuals’ consistency if
the population’s average strategy corresponds to a Nash strategy. Some more
terminology helps to clarify the discussion.
I shall call a pair (P,Q) ∈ Pn×m ×Qm×n perfectly consistent if it is a strict
Nash strategy, that is, if P and Q are permutation matrices and one matrix is
the transpose of the other; I shall call it perfectly inconsistent if both matrices,
P and Q, are permutation matrices, but if pi,j = 1 implies that qj,i = 0, and
if qj,i = 1 implies that pi,j = 0. So an agent with perfectly inconsistent sender
and receiver matrices will link every event unambiguously to one signal that is
not used for any other event, but when he or she receives this signal, it will
associate with a diﬀerent event.
In framework of Example 1, that is, in the case of 2 events and 2 signals,




































Remarkably, there are compositions of the population that correspond to a
Nash strategy, where all individual types use perfectly inconsistent sender and
receiver matrices.
26Suppose, for example, that one half of the population uses pure strategy
(P1,Q2) and the other half uses pure strategy (P2,Q1). In this case, the popu-



































Of course, the fact that minimal consistency on the level of the population’s
average does not necessarily extend to the same consistency criterion on the
level of individual agents is just a reﬂection of the more general fact that, if
the composition of the population corresponds to a Nash strategy, this does not
necessarily imply that every type that is present in this population with some
non–negligible fraction uses a Nash strategy.
However, from the characterization of neutrally stable strategies in the pre-
vious section, we see easily that a population’s average as in (24) cannot be
neutrally stable, since there are multiple column maxima strictly between zero
and 1 in both the average sender and the average receiver matrix. Indeed, this
population is highly vulnerable to be invaded by some mutant strategy—either
(P1,Q1) or (P2,Q2).
More generally, it can be shown that in a neutrally stable population there
can be no type that uses perfectly inconsistent sender and receiver matrices.
Lemma 8. Let ( ¯ P, ¯ Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n be a population’s average strategy that
is neutrally stable. Then no type l playing one of the pure strategies (Pl,Ql) ∈
Pn×m×Qm×n that is present in this population with some non–negligible fraction
xl > 0 can have perfectly inconsistent sender and receiver matrices.
Proof. The proof is an application of Lemma 5 together with the best–response
properties of Nash strategies. Suppose there is a fraction α > 0 of agents who
use permutation matrix P1 for sending messages and permutation matrix Q2
for receiving messages, where P1 and Q2 are perfectly inconsistent, that is, if
p1
i?j? = 1, then q2
j?i? = 0 but q2
j?i0 = 1 for some i0 6= i?. So we know that for
the average strategy proﬁle of the population, ¯ pi?j? ≥ α as well as ¯ qj?i0 ≥ α
for some i0 6= i?, for all j?. By the supposition of the proposition the average
strategy proﬁle ( ¯ P, ¯ Q) is a Nash strategy. Since ¯ qj?i0 6= 0, by the best–response
properties that must hold true in a Nash strategy, we know that ¯ pi0j? must be a
maximal element of the j?–th column in ¯ P. Since ¯ pi?j? ≥ α, we must have that
¯ pi0j? ≥ α as well. However, since P1 is a permutation matrix, we know that
there is some j0 6= j? such that p1
i0j0 = 1, which implies that ¯ pi0j? can never be
1. Therefore, 0 < α ≤ ¯ pi0j? < 1, that is, ¯ pi0j? is strictly between zero and 1, but
from Lemma 5 we know that this cannot be true in a neutrally stable strategy.
Consequently, there cannot be a positive fraction of agents using a perfectly
inconsistent pair of a sender and receiver matrix in a population whose average
strategy proﬁle is a neutrally stable strategy.
27Unfortunately, neutral stability is not strong enough to sort out partly incon-
sistent individual behavior.
Example 8. As an example for this, consider a population where the compo-


































α + β 1 − α − β 0
α + γ β 1 − α − β − γ
0 0 1

 = ¯ P, (25)
with α, β and γ strictly between zero and 1, and β > γ as well as 1−α−β > β,
so that ¯ p11 = α + β is the unique maximal element in the ﬁrst column of ¯ P,
¯ p12 = 1−α −β is the unique maximal element in the second column of ¯ P, and
¯ p33 = 1 is the unique maximal element in the third column of ¯ P. The receiver







 = ¯ Q. (26)
Clearly, the pair ( ¯ Q, ¯ P) as given by (25) and (26) is a Nash strategy; it even
is a neutrally stable strategy, as it can be checked by Proposition 1. Still there



















which does not satisfy minimal consistency: P is a best response to Q, but Q
is not a best response to P.
If, on the other hand, the population’s average strategy satisﬁes evolutionary
stability—that is, if ¯ P is a permutation matrix and ¯ Q is the transpose of ¯ P—
then, of course, we are in a monomorphic population state where all individual
agents use the same pair of a sender and a receiver matrix that mimics ( ¯ P, ¯ Q),
and all individual agents will have perfectly consistent sender and receiver ma-
trices.
6.4 No zero columns and interior states
An important consequence of neutral stability in the framework of population
games arises with respect to zero columns, or better their absence.
28In the framework of population games, a zero column in ¯ P simply means
that there is a particular signal that is never used by anybody in this population,
whereas a zero column in ¯ Q means that there is an event that is never under-
stood, which we can interpret in the sense that nobody in this population has
acquired an abstract concept of this event yet. Intuitively, then, it is irrelevant
what one would understand if a signal that nobody uses was received, or what
one will send in the face of an event for which nobody has a concept. Formally,
this is reﬂected by the possibility of zero columns in a Nash strategy.
On the other hand, if every pure strategy is present somewhere in the
population—that is, if the composition of the population corresponds to an
interior point of the simplex SL—then all elements in ¯ P and ¯ Q are positive, and
trivially then neither ¯ P nor ¯ Q will have any zero column.
As a consequence, every Nash strategy in the interior of SL has to be of the
Trapa–Nowak type—more precisely, it has to be of a particular subclass of this
type.
Lemma 9. If ( ¯ P, ¯ Q) is a Nash strategy in the interior of SL, then there exist
real numbers 0 < pj < 1, j = 1,...,m and 0 < qi < 1, i = 1,...,n such that
pij = pj ∀ i = 1,...,n, and
qji = qi ∀ j = 1,...,m.
Proof. The proof is immediate from the result of Trapa and Nowak (2000) in
combination with the fact that at an interior state all entries ¯ pij and ¯ qji are
necessarily strictly between zero and one for all i and for all j.
Example 9. Let m = 2 = n. Then the set of all Nash strategies that are in
the interior of the simplex is given by
Ninterior =
(
α 1 − α




β 1 − β





From Proposition 1 we directly see that a Nash strategy of that form cannot
be neutrally stable.
Lemma 10. If ( ¯ P, ¯ Q) is a Nash strategy in the interior of SL, then it cannot
be a neutrally stable strategy.
Proof. Lemma 9 together with Proposition 1.
Neutrally stable strategies, therefore, can only be at the boundary of the
simplex. As we will see, this has important consequences for the replicator
dynamics of this model.
297 The replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics, whose relations to game theoretical solution concepts
have been studied thoroughly by evolutionary game theorists9 translates the idea
that over time strategies corresponding to diﬀerent types expand, or contract,
according to the diﬀerence of their performance with respect to the average
performance in the population.
In continuous time, this can be written as a system of diﬀerential equations,
˙ x1
x1








= fL(x) − ¯ f(x), (27)
where ˙ xl is the derivative of xl with respect to time, that is, ˙ xl/xl is the growth
rate of xl, fl(x) is the ﬁtness of strategy l and ¯ f(x) the average ﬁtness in the
population as deﬁned by equations (22) and (23), respectively. A state of this
system is a vector of L type frequencies, x ∈ SL.
As such this dynamics is not more than a black–box mechanism that gives
positive feedback to relatively more successful strategies. For the model dis-
cussed here this can be interpreted in terms of biological as well as cultural
transmission of strategies from one generation to the next. Agents who com-
municate more successfully are more successful in getting good food, escaping
dangers, etc. Therefore, it can be argued, they have a direct advantage in re-
production, and, assuming that parents directly transmit their P’s and Q’s to
their oﬀspring, either biologically or culturally, the P’s and Q’s of agents who
communicate better will reproduce with a higher rate. Or, what is a slightly
diﬀerent approach, the replicator dynamics also can be interpreted in the sense
of some imitation mechanism. Agents who are more successful in escaping dan-
gers, getting good food etc. are more likely to be imitated and therefore also
their communicative strategies will reproduce more successfully.
A state x? for which ˙ x∗
l = 0 for all l—that is, a state for which all movement
comes to an end—is a rest point of this dynamics. Note that at such a state the
performance of every pure strategy that occurs with some positive frequency
has to be equal to the average performance in the population, which means
that a population state whose average strategy corresponds to a Nash strategy
necessarily is a rest point of this dynamics.
As usually, a rest point x? is said to be locally asymptotically stable if after
a small perturbation in the state variables that stays within suﬃciently small
boundaries around the rest point the dynamics eventually will lead back to this
9See in particular Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)
30point; and it is said to be Lyapunov stable if every neighborhood B(x?) contains
a neighborhood B0(x?) such that for all initial states in B0(x?) the dynamics
does not leave B(x?) as time proceeds.
Given its high dimensionality—for 2 events and 2 signals there are already
16 pure types—it is generally not possible to solve explicitly for this dynamics.
However, in the context discussed here we are not so much interested in any
particular solution path, but more in the qualitative regularity patterns of the
proto–language, if any, that can be explained to occur under this dynamics in
the long run.
One of the advantages of formulating the model under study as a game is
that we can make use of the rich body of results established by evolutionary
game theorists that link the static equilibrium analysis to the qualitative proper-
ties of speciﬁc evolutionary dynamics. One of the most important results—due
to Taylor and Jonker (1978), Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund (1979), as well as
Zeeman (1979)—is that every evolutionarily stable strategy is a locally asymptot-
ically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics. Thomas (1985), which later
on also has been shown in a more general way by Bomze and Weibull (1995),
shows that an analog implication holds true between the weaker versions of
these static and dynamic stability concepts: every neutrally stable strategy is
Lyapunov stable in the replicator dynamics. Importantly, none of the converse
of these results is true in general. However, for the model discussed here, help
comes from the double symmetry of the game.
7.1 The replicator dynamics for doubly symmetric games
For games with a symmetric payoﬀ matrix, the replicator dynamics constitutes
a gradient system, which induces a strictly monotonic increase in the average
ﬁtness along every non–stationary solution path; that is, the average ﬁtness
¯ f(x) = tr( ¯ P(x) ¯ Q(x)) is a strict Lyapunov function for this dynamics10. In fact
this can be seen as an instance of what in biology is known as Fisher’s Funda-
mental Theorem of Natural Selection, that the average ﬁtness in a population
increases in the process of evolution. For the long–run behavior on this system
this has several implications:
(a) In this case—as established by Akin and Hofbauer (1982) and Losert and
Akin (1983)—every orbit, indeed, converges to some rest point; and
(b) as shown by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), evolutionarily stable strategies
coincide with the locally asymptotically stable rest points of the replicator
dynamics, and are given by the locally strict maxima of the average payoﬀ
function.
In combination with the static analysis of evolutionary stability for the
sender–receiver game discussed here (Trapa and Nowak, 2000) this directly
yields the following:
10For a more detailed account see Hofbauer and Sigmund or Weibull
31Proposition 2. For the replicator dynamics of the symmetrized sender–receiver
game Γn,n:
(a) Every orbit converges to some rest point; and
(b) there are exactly n! locally asymptotically stable rest points located at those
vertices of the simplex SL where ¯ P is a permutation matrix and ¯ Q is the
transpose of ¯ P; all the other rest points cannot be locally asymptotically
stable.
Note that if ¯ P is a permutation matrix and ¯ Q is the transpose of ¯ P, the the
average payoﬀ attains its maximum value and the full potential of communica-
tion is realized in this population.
This, however it is not the complete picture. From the fact that only the
strict Nash strategies can be locally asymptotically stable, we cannot conclude
that the system will almost always lead to such a state. Withstanding the
fact that each single rest point that corresponds to a non–strict Nash strategy
cannot be locally asymptotically stable, there can be sets of non–strict Nash
strategies, which, as a set, do attract some positive measured set of states.
Neutral stability, as it turns out, is key to explaining this.
Bomze (2002) shows that for doubly symmetric games and pairwise interac-
tion Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics implies neutral stability, so
that for this case the two concepts coincide. For the model discussed here this
implies that the replicator dynamics almost always ﬂows to the boundary of
simplex.
Proposition 3. For the replicator dynamics of the symmetrized sender–receiver
game Γm=n, a rest point x∗ ∈ SL
(a) is Lyapunov stable if and only if the corresponding population’s average
strategy ( ¯ P(x∗), ¯ Q(x∗)) satisﬁes the condition that (i) at least ¯ P(x∗) or
¯ Q(x∗) has no zero column, and (ii) neither ¯ P(x∗) nor ¯ Q(x∗) has any
column with multiple maximal elements that are strictly between zero and
1;
(b) a rest point in the interior of the simplex SL never can be Lyapunov stable.
Proof. The proof of (a) is a direct application of the equivalence result in Bomze
(2002) together with Proposition 1, the static characterization of neutrally stable
strategies. Point (b) follows from (a) together with Lemma 10. Note that for
(b) we really need that Lyapunov stability implies neutral stability; otherwise
we could not conclude that a strategy that is not neutrally stable also cannot
be Lypunov stable.
Taking Propositions 2 and 3 together, this means that for almost all initial
conditions, the replicator dynamics of the symmetrized sender–receiver game
will always ﬂow to the boundary of the simplex, to a neutrally stable strategy,
but not necessarily to an evolutionarily stable strategy.
328 Interpretation and conclusions
So combining the static analysis of neutrally stable strategies for the sym-
metrized sender–receiver game Γ∆
n×m with the qualitative properties of the
replicator dynamics for doubly symmetric games, we see that this dynamics
generically will lead to a proto–language that satisﬁes the following regularity
patterns on the level of the population’s average sender and receiver matrices:
There cannot be two (or more) events that are linked to (two) or more sig-
nals in parallel, and there can be no signal that remains idle in the presence of
events that are never possibly understood; however there can be isolated cases
of homonymy or synonymy where two (or more) events share the use of one and
the same signal, or where two (or more) signals are associated with one and the
same event.
This is exactly what is reﬂected in the simulation reported in Nowak and
Krakauer (1999), where for the same number of signals and events the replicator
dynamics that they model seems to converge to a common proto–language where
two events share the use of one signal while another signal remains idle. The
analytical result presented here, therefore, supports the conjecture that Nowak
and Krakauer (1999) draw from their simulations: Evolution does not necessarily
lead to an optimal proto–language, but it can be blocked in a state where due
to ambiguities in event–signal relations some of the potential of communication
will be left unexploited. However, what hinders the dynamics to converge to
an optimum solution is not the fact that ambiguities in event–signal relations
can be evolutionarily stable in the strict sense, but that they can be neutrally
stable.
On the individuals’ level this means that not every type will necessarily end
up with a perfectly consistent proto–language. There are polymorphic popula-
tions states that are neutrally stable, and therefore also Lyapunov stable, where
not every type satisﬁes minimal consistency in the sense that the individual’s
receiver matrix is a best–response to the individual’s sender matrix and vice
versa. However, as we can see from Proposition 8, in a neutrally stable pop-
ulation no type will use perfectly inconsistent lexical matrices for sending and
receiving messages.
8.1 Future work
The results presented here depend on the assumption that all events that pos-
sibly become the object of communication enter the payoﬀ function with the
same weight as well as that all available signals also enter the payoﬀ function
with the same weights.
Formally, the introduction of diﬀerent weights of events amounts to multiply-
ing every row element in the sender matrix with the respective weight, whereas
the introduction of weights of signals amounts to multiplying every row element
in the receiver matrix with the respective weight. Assuming that all weights
are indeed diﬀerent, this destroys the possible sources of homonymy and respec-
tively synonymy in a neutrally stable strategy. Whenever in the position of the
33sender there are two (or more) events linked to the same signal with probability
1, but where one of these events is relatively more important than the others,
then, of course, the best response to this in terms of the receiver matrix is to
associate this signal with the event that is relatively more important. There-
fore this cannot be a Nash strategy. Analogously, the introduction of diﬀerent
weights to signals destroys the multiplicity of best–responses in terms of the
sender matrix, and therefore synonymy as a phenomenon in a neutrally stable
strategy. This means that the results presented here allow us to account for
homonymy of events that are equally important and synonymy of signals that
are of the same costs.
Another assumption that we made throughout, almost silently, is that there
is a large population where agents are matched randomly according to the fre-
quencies of types in the overall population. In particular we did not take into
account any spatial structure that is imposed on the population. Diﬀerences
in the frequency or importance of events as well as costs of signals typically
vary with the environment. On the other hand, language diﬀerentiation is one
of the general linguistic facts that needs explanation. Interesting extensions of
this model therefore point into the direction of considering the combined eﬀects
of locally structured population and diﬀerences in the frequencies of events or
costs of signals in diﬀerent environments.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. Suppose that (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n is a Nash strategy, and assume
that the j?–th column of P as well as the i?–th column of Q consist entirely of
zero elements.
In order to show that (P,Q) is not neutrally stable, by Remark 2, we have
to show that there is some P0 ∈ B(Q) and some Q0 ∈ B(P) with P0 6= P or
Q0 6= Q such that
tr(P0Q0) > tr(PQ).
Now, take as a candidate P0 the original P but with the entries in its i?–th




1 for j = j?
0 otherwise ;
35and take as a candidate Q0 the original Q but with the entries in its j?-th row




1 for i = i?
0 otherwise .
We ﬁrst check that P0 is indeed a best response to Q. Since the elements of
the i?–th column of Q are all zero, the product of the i?–th column of Q with
the i?–th row of any sender matrix will be zero. So, whatever the elements in
the i?–th row of P might have been, we “loose” nothing by setting p0
i?j? equal to
1. Since in constructing P0 from P we did not change the elements of any other
row, tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ). By an analogous argument with the roles of sender and
receiver matrices reversed, we have that tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ), which means that




ji = pijqji whenever i 6= i? or j 6= j?.





















and (P,Q) cannot be neutrally stable.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Suppose that (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m ×Q∆
m×n is a Nash strategy. As for Lemma
4, we have to show that there is some P0 ∈ B(Q) and some Q0 ∈ B(P), such
that
tr(P0Q0) > tr(PQ).
We give the proof for the case where the condition of the proposition applies
to Q. Analogous reasoning holds true for the case where it applies to P.
Suppose that the i?–th column of Q contains more than one maximum ele-
ment that is positive but not equal to 1. Since Q is a best response to P, for
all j ∈ A(q·i?), pi?j is a maximal, but not the unique maximal element of its
respective column in P: If pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) was not a maximal element of
36the j–th column of P, then qji? could not be positive. If, on the other hand,
pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) was the unique maximal element of the j–th column of P,
then qji? would have to be exactly equal to 1. Note that this does not exclude
the possibility that for some j ∈ A(q·i?) the j–th column of P is a zero column.




and that pi?j = 0 whenever j / ∈ A(q·i?). This means that even though some of
the pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) might be zero, not all of them can be zero. At least one
of them has to be positive—and if it is really the only one, it has to be exactly
equal to 1. Since, by assumption, A(q·i?) has at least two elements, this implies
that P has at least (i) two columns with multiple maximal elements strictly
between 0 and 1, or (ii) a zero column, which proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
Suppose that for j?? with j?? ∈ A(q·i?), pi?j?? 6= 0. Note that we do not
rule out the possibility that pi?j?? is equal to 1. Since Q is a best response to
P, it must be true that
P
i∈A(p·j??) qj??i = 1. Remember, we know from above
that i? ∈ A(p·j??). But since 0 < qj??i? < 1 (and since the j??–th column of
P is not a zero column) there must be some i?? 6= i? with i?? ∈ A(p·j??) such
that qj??i?? 6= 0. Of course, since P is a best response to Q, qj??i?? is a maximal
element of the i??–th column of Q. In the case where maxi(pij??) = 1, qj??i??
might well be the unique maximal element of this column.






To see why this is so, consider the following argument: We know from above
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1 and that all these elements in the i?–th row of P for






However, any Q that is a best response to P “extracts” from P exactly the sum
of its column maxima, which gives the claim of the statement.
Now, we try to create an alternative Q0 that is doing as well against P, as
Q is doing against P; and an alternative P0 that is doing as well against Q, as
P is doing against Q.
Take as a candidate Q0 the original Q but exchange the entries in its j??–th




1 for i = i??
0 otherwise ,




1 for i = i?
0 otherwise ,
37where j? is some j ∈ A(q·i?) with j? 6= j??. Note that, since qj?i? 6= 0 and Q
is a best response to P, this also implies that pi?j? is a maximal element of the
i?–th column of P.
Since the original Q was a best response to P, and since in constructing Q0
form Q we did not change any rows other than the j??–th and j?–th row of Q,
all we have to do in order to show that tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ), is to show that the
j??–th and the j?–th row of Q0 successfully extract the maximum value of j??–
th and the j?–th column of P, respectively. We know from above that pi??j??
is a maximal element of the j??–th column of P, and that pi?j? is a maximal
element of the j?–th column of P. So setting their corresponding elements in
Q0, qj??i?? and qj?i?, equal to 1, clearly is optimal in order to maximize tr(PQ),
and so tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ).
As an alternative P0 take the original P but exchange the entries in its i??–th




1 for j = j??
0 otherwise ,




1 for j = j?
0 otherwise
We also know from above that qj?i? is a maximal element of the i?–th column
of Q (by assumption deﬁnitely not its unique maximal element) and that qj??i??
is a maximal element of the i??–th column of Q. As pointed out above, it even
might be the unique maximal element of this column. In any case, setting pi?j?
and pi??j?? equal to 1 clearly is an optimal choice in order to maximize tr(PQ),
and so tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ).












ji ≥ 2, (28)






We distinguish two cases now: Suppose ﬁrst that for the j?? ∈ A(q·i?) that
we have chosen above, pi?j?? = 1. Then, of course, also pi??j?? = 1. But this


























and we are done.
The case where 0 < pi?j?? < 1 is a little bit more complicated. Equation (28)
still holds, but equation (29) is no longer necessarily true. It might well be that
there are some j / ∈ A(q·i?) for which pi??j 6= 0. Hence, in constructing P0 form
P, when we replace the i?? row in P by the vector (p0
i??j) that is 1 for j = j??
and 0 otherwise, it might well be the case that we nullify some positive entries
pi??j for which j / ∈ A(q·i?) that might be attributed some positive weight to by Q!
So when we multiply the elements p0
i??j for j / ∈ A(q·i?) with their corresponding
elements in Q0—which deﬁnitely are unchanged for j / ∈ A(q·i?)—it might well
be that we “lose” something as compared to the same expressions in tr(PQ).
Nevertheless, since pi?j?? 6= 0, what we “lose” this way cannot be greater than















and therefore the original Nash strategy (P,Q) cannot be a neutrally stable
strategy.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Suppose that (P,Q) ∈ P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n is a Nash strategy. We give the
proof for the case where the condition of the proposition is satisﬁed for P;
analogous reasoning holds true for the case where it is satisﬁed for Q.
In order to show that (P,Q) is a neutrally stable state, by Remark 2, we
have to show that for any P0 ∈ B(Q) and Q0 ∈ B(P),
tr(P0Q0) ≤ tr(PQ).
If P has no column with multiple maximal elements that are not equal to
1, then for every ﬁxed column of P there are only three possible cases. Its
maximum is either
(1) unique and equal to 1, or
(2) unique, but not equal to 1, or
(3) equal to 1, but not unique.
Note that, in particular, there is no zero column in P.
Starting with the assumptions on the columns of P—for each of these three
cases in turn—we will ﬁrst try to exploit all the information we can get about
39the corresponding rows in Q and the other columns in P that derive from the
fact that P and Q are best responses to each other. In the following step we
will consider the consequences for the corresponding rows of all possible receiver
matrices that are best responses to P, that is, Q0 ∈ B(P), and the corresponding
columns of all possible sender matrices that are best responses to Q, that is,
P0 ∈ B(Q). Multiplying columns with their corresponding rows, we will see
that, for each of these three cases, these column–times–row products for P0 and
Q0 are always smaller than or equal to their corresponding expressions for the
original P and Q. Summing over all these products ﬁnally yields the result.
Case 1. (One event exclusively linked to one signal.) Suppose that pi?j? = 1 is the
unique maximal element in the j?–th column of P.
Since Q is a best response to P, qj?i? = 1, and qj?i = 0 whenever i 6= i?.
Note that, since there are no entries greater than 1, this immediately
implies that qj?i? is a maximal element of the i?–th column of Q.
Since the elements in each row of P add up at most to 1, we also have that
pi?j = 0 whenever j 6= j?. Since by assumption there are no columns in P
that consist entirely of zeros, all these elements in the i?-th row of P that
are equal to 0, cannot be maximal elements of their respective columns
j 6= j?. Since Q is a best response to P, qji? = 0 whenever j 6= j?. So,
qji? =

1 for j = j?
0 otherwise . (30)
This means that qj?i? = 1 is not only a but the unique maximal element
in the i?–th column of Q.
Now, we turn to Q0 ∈ B(P) and P0 ∈ B(Q). Since by assumption, pi?j?
is the unique maximal element in the j?–th column of P, we have that
q0
j?i? = 1 = qj?i? and q0
j?i = 0 = qj?i ∀ i 6= i?, (31)
for all Q0 ∈ B(P).
Since in this case, we also have that qj?i? = 1 is the unique maximal
element in the i?–th column of Q, Lemma 1 also tells us that
p0
i?j? = 1 = pi?j?, (32)
for all P0 ∈ B(Q).









for all (P0,Q0) such that P0 ∈ B(Q) and Q0 ∈ B(P).
Figure 1.1 illustrates this case.
40Case 2. (Synonymy.) Suppose that 0 < pi?j? < 1 is the unique maximal element
in the j?–th column of P.
As in the previous case, from Q being a best response to P, we have that
qj?i? = 1, and that qj?i = 0 for all i 6= i?. Since there are no elements
greater than 1, this again implies that qj?i? is a maximal element of the
i?–th column of Q. But now, since pi?j? 6= 1, by Lemma 1, the fact that P
is a best response to Q, implies that qj?i? cannot be the unique maximal
element in the i?–th column of Q, and, of course, since the elements in
each row may not add up to something greater than 1, we have that for
all j ∈ A(q·i?), qji = 0 whenever i 6= i?. But since the maximum of
the i?–th column of Q is not equal to zero, by Lemma 1 we also have
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1, and that pi?j = 0 for all j / ∈ A(q·i?). Together
with the assumption that 0 < pi?j? < 1, this in turn implies that for
all j ∈ A(q·i?), pji? 6= 1. On the other hand, since for all j ∈ A(q·i?),
qji? = 1 6= 0 and Q is a best response to P, by Lemma 1, we also know
that for all j ∈ A(q·i?), pji? is a maximal element of its respective column
in P. Together with the assumption that P has no zero column and no
column with multiple maximal elements strictly between 0 and 1, this
implies that for all j ∈ A(q·i?), 0 < pi?j < 1 is the unique maximal
element of its respective column in P.
In perfect analogy to the previous case, the fact that pi?j = 0 for all
j / ∈ A(q·i?) together with the assumption that P does not contain any
zero column implies that qji? = 0 whenever j / ∈ A(q·i?). So,
qji? =

1 for j ∈ A(q·i?)
0 otherwise . (34)
We now turn again to Q0 and P0. Since for all j ∈ A(q·i?) it is true that
0 < pi?j < 1 is the unique maximal element of its respective column, by
Lemma 1 we have that that for all j ∈ A(q·i?)
q0
ji? = 1 = qji?, and q0
ji = 0 = qji ∀ i 6= i?, (35)
for all Q0 ∈ B(P). On the other hand, the fact that the i?–th column of








for all P0 ∈ B(Q).












pijqji = 1, (37)
for all (P0,Q0) such that P0 ∈ B(Q) and Q0 ∈ B(P).
This case is illustrated by Figure 1.2.
41Case 3. (Homonymy.) Suppose that pi?j? is equal to 1, but not the unique maximal
element in the j?-th column of P. So, i? ∈ A(p·j?), but there is at least
one i?? 6= i? such that i ∈ A(p·j?).
In this case, from Q being a best response to P, by Lemma 1 we only
have that
P
i∈A(p·j?) qj?i = 1, and that qj?i = 0 whenever i / ∈ A(p·j?). In
particular, this does not imply that qj?i 6= 0 for all i ∈ A(p·j?).
On the other hand, from the constraint that the elements in each row
cannot add up to something greater than 1, we also have that for all
i ∈ A(p·j?), pij = 0 whenever j 6= j?. Since by assumption P does not
contain any column that consist entirely of zeros, any zero element in P
can never be a maximal element of its respective column, and since Q is a
best response to P, we have that for all i ∈ A(p·j?), qji = 0 for all j 6= j?.
This implies that all the qj?i such i ∈ A(p·j?) are maximal elements of
their respective columns. But since not all them are necessarily non–zero,
this means that they are not necessarily the unique maximal element of
this column, and there might be a zero column in Q. But, if qj?i with
i ∈ A(p·j?) is equal to some positive value, then it deﬁnitely will be the
unique maximal element of its column in P. So,
qji =

maxj(qji) for j = j?
0 otherwise . (38)








j?i = 0 = qj?i ∀ i / ∈ A(p·j?), (39)
for all Q0 ∈ B(P).
The case of P0 ∈ B(Q) is a little bit more complicated. As we have seen
above, whenever qj?i 6= 0 for some i ∈ A(p·j?), then it deﬁnitely will be
the unique maximal element of its respective column in Q. By Lemma
1, its corresponding element in P0 then has to be equal to 1. But if for
some i ∈ A(p·j?), qj?i = 0, then p0
ij? does not have to be equal to 1—even
though it can be equal to 1 or to some other positive value. So, if for some
i ∈ A(pij?),
p0
ij? 6= 0 ⇒ pij? = 1. (40)








pij?qj?i = 1, (41)
for all (P0,Q0) such that P0 ∈ B(Q) and Q0 ∈ B(P).
Figure 1.3 illustrates this case.
42So, whatever the cases out of these three possible cases that might be
captured by any sender matrix P that is part of a Nash strategy (P,Q) ∈
P∆
n×m × Q∆
m×n, we have that
(i) the maximum of each column in Q is either unique or equal to 1; and













which means that (P,Q) is a neutrally stable strategy.





− − < 1







U U U U U U U U U U U U


































− < 1 − α < α
− < 1 − α < α






V V V V V V V V V V










































V V V V V V V V V V V V































Figure 1. Proof of Proposition 7. For all three cases in turn, we always apply
the following basic line of reasoning. First, exploit the fact that P and Q are best
responses to each other. Second, consider the properties of any P0 and Q0 that are
best responses to Q and respectively P. And, ﬁnally, show that the trace of any
P0 ∈ B(Q) times any Q0 ∈ B(P) can never be strictly greater than the trace of
the original P times the original Q.
44 






Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language. 
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